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  TRANSACTIONS ACCOUNTS AND LOAN MONITORING 
 





We provide evidence that transactions accounts help financial intermediaries monitor borrowers 
by offering lenders a continuous stream of data on borrowers’ account balances.  This information is most 
readily available to commercial banks, but other intermediaries, such as finance companies, also have 
access to such information at a cost.  Using a unique set of data that includes monthly and annual 
information on small-business borrowers at an anonymous Canadian bank, we find a significant 
relationship between loans becoming troubled and the number of prior borrowings in excess of collateral. 
 Since the bank monitors the value of collateral (defined as accounts receivable plus inventory) at high 
frequency through the transactions account of the borrower, this unique access to useful information gives 
banks an advantage over other lenders.  We also find that banks more intensively monitor loans that have 
a higher number of violations of the collateral limit. 
 
  
JEL Codes: G10, G20, G21 
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Does observing transactions help financial intermediaries monitor borrowers?  We provide 
evidence that information on the cash flows into and out of a borrower’s transactions account can help an 
intermediary monitor the changing value of collateral – namely, accounts receivable and inventory – that 
a commercial borrower has posted for an operating loan.  In this paper, we analyze a unique set of data 
that includes monthly and annual information on transactions account balances, accounts receivable, and 
inventories for small-business borrowers at a Canadian bank that wishes to remain anonymous.  In 
particular, we test the hypothesis that the lender uses information from borrower transactions accounts to 
ascertain that operating loans are being used for normal operating purposes (financing inventory and 
accounts receivable) rather than financing unanticipated cash shortfalls and to detect and control moral 
hazard problems associated with a rising probability of bankruptcy. 
We establish that the transactions account provides useful information to the lender and 
characterize how the lender responds to the information.  Specifically, we find first that monthly changes 
in accounts receivable are quite transparently perceivable in movements in the transactions account, 
especially when the borrower has an exclusive banking relationship with the lender.  Our second finding 
is that the number of prior borrowings in excess of collateral is a clear predictor of credit downgrades and 
loan write-downs, and the lender uses this information promptly.  Our third finding is that the lender 
intensifies monitoring as loans deteriorate – loan reviews become lengthier and are more frequent. 
Taken together, these findings establish a set of links showing that financial intermediaries can, 
and do, use transactions accounts to monitor accounts receivable and inventories; and we show how this 
one particular bank does so.  Our finding on the transparency of changes in accounts receivable and 
transactions accounts covers more than 1200 firm-months of data.  Even though our data come from a 
particular bank, the bank does not control these cash flow movements (most obviously for healthy   3
borrowers).  Thus, in our view, the results based on this data set are likely to be broadly representative of 
how transactions account information can be used to monitor collateralized asset-based loans to small-
business borrowers in general. 
  Transactions account information is most readily available to commercial banks, but it is also 
available to other types of lenders, such as finance companies.  According to Udell (2004), finance 
companies and other asset-based lenders typically require their borrowers to establish special bank 
accounts in order to keep track of loans collateralized by accounts receivable.  This deposit account, 
called a cash collateral account, is used strictly for the purpose of receiving all remittances on collected 
receivables.  If the asset-based lender is not a bank, then the account is set up at a bank that works with 
the asset-based lender.  Remittances are sent to this bank and typically are held for several days by the 
bank to cover deposit collectibility.  Then the asset-based lender draws down these funds and applies 
them to reducing the loan.  The borrower sets up a separate checking account from which it makes 
disbursements.  The asset-based lender can monitor the cash flows into and out of these accounts to obtain 
the same kind of information on its borrowers that a commercial bank lender can obtain from the 
borrower’s checking account.
1   
Since the asset-based lender needs to contract with another intermediary to maintain the 
transactions accounts while the bank lender maintains the checking account on its own, it is likely that the 
asset-based lender faces slightly higher costs for accessing the transactions account cash-flow information 
than would a bank. The bank’s advantage over an asset-based lender may be greater when lending to less 
risky borrowers. That’s because the bank faces higher regulatory costs than the asset-based lender, which 
means that any cost advantage from the checking account information may be offset by higher regulatory 
costs the bank faces when lending to risky borrowers. This could be one of the factors leading to finance 
                                                      
1Indeed, by segregating the flow of funds from accounts receivable from other flows, these accounts 
allow the asset-based lender to more easily keep track of accounts receivable than in the checking account 
at the Canadian bank that we describe, which is a single account for payments in and out. 
   4
companies’ specialization in lending to riskier borrowers, particularly more leveraged borrowers, as 
shown by Carey, et al. (1998).   
That a commercial bank gleans information from transactions accounts at a slightly lower cost 
than a finance company supports the view of Black (1975) and Fama (1985) that banks are “special” 
monitors of borrowers because their role in the payments mechanism gains them privileged information.
2 
 However, that “specialness” has likely fallen over time, since declines in the cost of information 
processing and communication over the postwar period have likely lowered the cost of the duplication of 
bank services.  This is one of the factors that has contributed to the substantial increase in finance 
company lending relative to commercial bank lending to businesses over the past 30 years.
3  
To our knowledge, this paper is the first direct empirical test of the usefulness of transactions 
account information in monitoring commercial borrowers.   Previous empirical research has documented 
the value of lending relationships to firms by examining loan rates (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger 
and Udell, 1995; and Berlin and Mester, 1998).  Other studies have documented a positive abnormal 
stock-price reaction to announcements of new or continuing bank loan agreements or loan commitments 
(e.g., Lummer and McConnell, 1989; Billet, Flannery, and Garfinkel, 1995; and Preece and Mullineaux, 
1996).  Berlin and Mester (1999) present empirical evidence for an explicit link between banks’ liability 
structure and their distinctive lending behavior.  Yet none of these previous papers directly examines the 
mechanism through which a financial intermediary with access to transactions account data is able to gain 
an information advantage over other types of lenders.  And this is the focus of our paper. 
Recent papers by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) offer 
alternative, complementary theoretical rationales for combining deposits and lending under a single roof.  
Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002) argue that taking deposits and offering lines of credit are forms of 
liquidity provision that are optimally bundled together as long as they are not perfectly correlated.  With 
                                                      
2The importance of proprietary information and banking, using the example of R&D contests, is explored 
in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995).   5
such bundling, a bank is better able to hedge the risk of withdrawal.  Gatev and Strahan (2003) provide 
evidence that banks can hedge liquidity risk from the commercial paper market because they receive 
offsetting inflows into transactions accounts.  Our paper provides a rationale for those offsetting inflows:  
banks are best able to detect changes in risk because of superior monitoring capability.  Diamond and 
Rajan (2001) argue that by taking deposits, banks commit themselves to bearing withdrawal risk.  This 
commitment is beneficial, since it commits the bank to using its skill to collect from borrowers to repay 
depositors.  (If a lender did not try to collect payment from borrowers, a run would be precipitated and the 
bank would fail.)  This commitment means that deposits that are withdrawn from the bank to meet 
unforeseen liquidity needs can be replaced by new deposits, since new depositors are confident the bank 
will work to collect from borrowers to repay depositors.  At the same time, borrowers are insulated from 
unforeseen liquidity needs of direct investors. 
In this paper, we explore detailed micro data that show transactions account information is indeed 
relatively transparent for monitoring borrowers’ collateral and that such monitoring is useful in detecting 
problems with loans. 
 
2. The Mechanics of Loan Monitoring 
When a borrower suffers unexpected losses, its probability of bankruptcy rises and, by a familiar 
moral hazard mechanism, its incentive to invest optimally falls (Myers and Majluf, 1984).  A lender who 
monitors the borrower’s account and is able to detect such losses may be able to create incentives for the 
borrower to take actions that improve expected return (Nakamura, 1993a).  In particular, the lender may 
strive to ensure that the operating loan extended by the lender finances operations and does not finance 
unexpected equity losses.  It is thus an important advantage to a lender to be able to detect changes in 
normal seasonal borrowing needs, i.e., flows of inventory and accounts receivable.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
3 Data from the Federal Reserve Flow of Funds Accounts show that the ratio of finance company loans to 
commercial bank C&I loans has risen from about 17 percent in 1975 to 43 percent in 2003.    6
Although the banking literature cites a commercial bank’s ability to monitor borrowers as one of 
its special talents, the literature rarely describes what gives the bank its monitoring advantage over other 
types of lenders.  We argue that a commercial bank loan officer (or finance company lender) has access to 
fine-grained information about a borrower’s activities through its operating account, as he or she can 
observe transactions on an item-by-item basis and compare them to the borrower’s pro forma business 
plan.  The continuing operation of a business demands that the business be able to meet its financial 
requirements, which means that the business must have enough cash to pay its employees, suppliers, and 
others.  The cash flows of the business are recorded in its transactions account.  This account information 
is likely to be one of the timeliest sources of information available to the lender.  Moreover, as Nakamura 
(1993a,b) has argued, checking account information is relatively more transparent and complete for a 
small-business borrower whose banking relationship is exclusive to a single lender. 
Borrowers at our bank are contractually required to provide a flow of information about accounts 
receivable and inventory, but this information may be unreliable. The loan contract restricts the amount of 
the loan to certain percentages of accounts receivable and of inventory.  It also requires the borrower to 
report shipments to customers that constitute new accounts receivable, as well as customer payments on 
accounts receivable.
4  A borrower whose business is foundering may be tempted to submit false 
statements to boost the availability of credit, particularly if these reports are within the bounds of 
plausible error.  For example, an account that has already been paid may be included among receivables.  
Or an order that has not yet been shipped may be called a receivable.  However, by observing the detailed 
flow of payments received, the loan officer can verify that each receivable is followed, within 90 days, by 
a payment.   
In fact, every month, the loan officer can do an item-by-item reconciliation of the accounts 
receivable: beginning-of-month receivables + sales (operating revenues; also new receivables) − cash 
inflows (checks) = end-of-month receivables. If the borrower accurately reports beginning-of-month, new 
                                                      
4Appendix 1 shows language from a representative loan contract for the bank we study.   7
receivables, and end-of-month receivables, then the information on cash inflows is redundant.  However, 
there will be an ever-present temptation to report inaccurately due to time pressure or to permit higher 
borrowing. The checking account provides a check not just on the veracity of the borrower but on how 
carefully the business manages accounts receivable, itself a telling sign.  The converse is that if a lender 
cannot easily check on the accuracy of the borrower’s statement, then the borrower may drift into habitual 
mendacity. 
If the borrower were to attempt to cut off the flow of information by opening a checking account 
with a different bank without informing the lending bank, the absence of the borrower’s payments for 
inventory and of payments received for accounts receivable would quickly reveal this chicanery.  As we 
note below, when exclusive borrowers become troubled and their incentive to hide information rises, the 
information content of their transactions accounts deteriorates somewhat but remains high. 
Finance companies, as we have pointed out, can establish relationships with banks that enable 
them to have similar access to bank lenders, but this does add an additional layer of expense.  Many of the 
largest U.S. banks have established or purchased subsidiary finance companies.  
Before continuing, it may be worthwhile mentioning that in the Canadian bank being studied, an 
operating loan is supplied as a negative-balance checking account, a typical practice in English banking.  
In the U.S., by contrast, the operating loan and the checking account are separated, with the checking 
account balance, at least in principle, required to be positive.  Thus, the operating loan balance plus the 
checking account balance in the U.S. would be equal to the operating loan balance in this Canadian bank. 
   8
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A lender without access to transactions account information in either the U.S. or Canada would 
observe only the loan balance.  This would consist of a series of debits and credits between the firm’s 
checking account at the firm’s bank and the loan account at the firm’s lender.  In general, this lender does 
not see the individual payments the firm makes from its bank transactions account that pay suppliers, 
workers, and other creditors, nor those payments that are made into the account by clients.  A bank lender 
(or other lender with access to transactions account data), on the other hand, using the English-style 
account, observes Bt, the payments between the borrower and the rest of the world, but there is no 
separate loan account.  In contrast, a bank lender using the system prevalent in the U.S. observes Ct and 
Lt.  Thus, the U.S.-style bank lender observes both the payments between the borrower and the rest of the 
world, and between the loan account and the transactions account.  The U.S. bank accounting system 
provides somewhat more information than this Canadian bank’s system, and it is possible that drawdowns 
of the operating loan may represent signals the bank can interpret.  Thus, if anything, the results found 
using our Canadian data should indicate the lower bound on the information available in U.S.-style 
banking systems.  On the other hand, the gross liability of the bank to the borrower and vice versa are 
greater under the U.S.-style banking practice because the transactions account and loan account are not 
netted. 
The loans we are describing – whether from a bank lender or an asset-based lender – generally 
follow a standard sequence of inventory creation, shipment, and receipt of revenue.  We will show that 
under normal circumstances, this sequence is revealed transparently, i.e.,  assets in the form of inventory 
and accounts receivable are mirrored in a sequence of payments in the bank operating account.  A change   9
in these normal patterns of cash flows into and out of the operating account is a signal to the bank that the 
borrower may be experiencing unanticipated operating losses or other problems. This signal can trigger 
additional monitoring by the bank and renegotiation with the borrower.  
The individual payments a borrower makes would be available to the borrower’s bank lender.  
However, our data set does not include transactions account information detailed enough to verify 
individual payments in this manner.  But it does allow us to demonstrate that the account balance 
provides a relatively transparent window on accounts receivable and inventory.  In the empirical work 
described below, we use correlations between inventory, accounts receivable, and bank balance to judge 
how easily the bank balance can be used to monitor operations.  We then show how this bank uses 
unexpected movements in the operating loan relative to inventory and accounts receivable to determine 
credit risk, intensify monitoring, and declare a loan troubled.  We now describe our data set more fully 
and then turn to our empirical implementation and results. 
 
3. The Data Set 
The data contain information on 100 small-business borrowers who are customers of the 
Canadian bank.  A small business is defined as one with authorized credit between C$500,000 and 
C$10,000,000 and whose shareholders are managers of the firm.  The average sum actually borrowed in 
our sample is about C$1,500,000.  The selected firms have been active for at least three years; public 
utilities, management firms, and financial companies are excluded.  Fifty of these loans were declared 
troubled by the bank during the period studied (which falls between 1988 and 1992), and these loans 
constitute substantially all of the bank’s troubled loans during this period that meet our criteria.  Declaring 
a loan troubled is a highly consequential act for the lender, as it is the point when the bank acknowledges 
a high probability of loss on the loan.  The other 50 loans in the sample were loans that remained healthy 
over the period studied and that matched the troubled loans along certain dimensions. That is, for each   10
troubled loan, we found a loan that remained healthy over the period studied and that matched the 
troubled loan by industry, level of annual sales, and loan amount.   
The first panel of Table 1 shows the outcomes for the troubled loans.  For the vast majority (36 
out of 50, i.e., 72 percent) of these loans, the borrowing firms ended up going into bankruptcy or were 
privately liquidated.
5  Of the other loans, nine remained troubled, four were repaid, and one was 
upgraded.  The Canadian category “troubled” matches reasonably well with the U.S. category “doubtful” 
and similarly requires a substantial write-down of assets.
6
  Most of these troubled loans were so classified between 1990 and 1992 (only three loans were 
classified as troubled before 1990); healthy loans were last reviewed by the bank at some date in 1991 or 
1992.  Six industrial sectors are represented in the data (see Table 2). 
For each loan, we have both annual and monthly data.  For a troubled loan, the annual data 
pertain to the firm’s three fiscal years prior to the loan’s being declared troubled, and the monthly data 
pertain to the three calendar years prior to the firm’s being declared troubled.  (The data are not 
necessarily complete for each loan.)  For the matched healthy loan, we have comparable information, with 
the reference date being the last time the firm’s credit file was reviewed by the bank.  For example, 
consider a firm whose loan was declared troubled in April 1991 and whose fiscal year runs from October 
to September.  Our annual data on this firm would cover the firm’s fiscal years FY1988, FY1989, and 
FY1990, and the monthly data would run from January 1988 through December 1990.
7
                                                      
5A private liquidation is a cooperative sell-off of assets without a court settlement.  When the owner has 
signed a personal guarantee as a part of the loan agreement, such a private liquidation is likely to be 
efficient, as the owner is strongly motivated to maximize liquidation value of the firm and minimize his 
personal liability.  Of course, if there are other claimants, liquidation may be complicated and bankruptcy 
entered into. 
6 “Doubtful” is one of the categories of “regulatory problem assets” identified by Treacy and Carey 
(1998) in their interviews with large U.S. banks.  In the U.S. a “doubtful” loan has a recommended 
specific reserve of 50 percent.  Such a loan has all the weaknesses inherent in a substandard loan and 
“collection/liquidation in full, on [the] basis of currently existing conditions, is highly questionable or 
improbable.”  For loans in this category, “specific pending factors may strengthen credit.”  The loans are 
treated “as loss deferred until [the] exact status can be determined” (Treacy and Carey, 1998). 
7Because the reference dates for a matched troubled loan and healthy loan differ, the data on two matched 
loans could potentially cover substantially different time periods, with significantly different   11
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An important variable included in our data set is whether the firm has an exclusive banking 
arrangement with the bank. In our data, of the 50 troubled loans, 33 of the borrowers have an exclusive 
relationship with the bank; of the 50 healthy loans, 26 have an exclusive relationship.   This variable 
allows us to segment the loans into “exclusive” and “nonexclusive” categories, providing a metric against 
which we can partially measure the quality of the bank’s information.  In general, having more than one 
banking relationship weakens the bank’s information. We can subdivide nonexclusive borrowers into two 
types: those with exclusive operating loan balances with our bank and at least one term loan (which 
includes mortgages) with another bank, and those with operating loan balances with another bank.  Of the 
41 nonexclusive borrowers, 27 have exclusive operating loans while 14 have operating loan balances with 
another bank.  Among the nonexclusive borrowers, the quality of information on those with exclusive 
operating loans would be higher quality than on those with nonexclusive operating loans. 
Our bank has relatively little information about the borrowers with operating loan balances with 
another bank.  In 10 of these 14 loans, the borrower does not have transactions account information.  The 
bank in these cases generally relies on the other bank to monitor the borrower and is typically offering the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
macroeconomic conditions.  But this does not seem to pose a large problem here, since the difference in 
reference dates was under two years in all but four cases, and the maximum difference was three and a   12
loan facility as part of the bank’s relationship with the other bank.  We cannot perform our tests on almost 
all of these borrowers.  By contrast, with exclusive operating loans the bank is typically the primary 
lender, even though its relationship with the customer may not be as tight as with an exclusive client.  
When we analyze informational flows in section 4, the informational contrasts we draw between 
exclusive and nonexclusive borrowers will almost entirely reflect the contrast between borrowers who 
have exclusive client relationships and borrowers who have term loans at another bank (but operating 
loans at our bank).   
3.1 Annual data 
The annual data contain information typically found on a firm’s financial statement, e.g., balance-
sheet data, such as the book value of accounts receivable and inventories; income-statement data; some 
items from the statement of changes in financial position; and information in the firm’s credit file.  Our 
data set also contains some information from the outside auditor’s report on the firm, e.g., whether there 
were any qualifications in the auditor’s report and the date of the audit.  These data would be available to 
any lender the firm approached for a loan.  Nonexclusive borrowers generally tend to have larger sales 
and often represent borrowers who are being accommodated by our bank because they have a plant or 
subsidiary outside their primary bank’s territory.
8
The credit file contains annual information about the firm’s sales, the level of authorized credit 
the firm has gotten from the bank for an operating loan, additional credit for seasonal loans, and other 
temporary loans.  In addition, there is information on whether the loan has covenants.  A crucial datum in 
each annual credit review is the credit rating assigned to the loan by the bank’s credit department upon 
                                                                                                                                                                           
half years for one loan pair. 
8One such borrower with unusually large sales of over $300 million distorts the data on “nonexclusive-
troubled” borrowers.  When that borrower is omitted, average sales for all three years falls to $14.5 
million for troubled loans, to $18.8 million for nonexclusive loans, and to $24.5 million for nonexclusive-
troubled loans.  This borrower’s data, fortunately, do not materially affect any of our other results.  
Indeed, when this borrower is omitted, the results of our statistical tests are, on average, slightly more 
favorable to our hypotheses.   13
completion of the review.  This credit rating is arranged on a scale of one through eight, with one being 
the best, and six through eight being different degrees of “trouble.” 
The second panel of Table 1 shows some of the annual data on our borrowers.  The first 4 rows 
show the average loan sizes (measured by the average amount actually borrowed) for all the loans and for 
the healthy and troubled loan subsamples over the entire three-year period covered by the data and over 
each year individually, where the years are measured relative to the reference date (i.e., for a troubled 
loan, the three fiscal years prior to the loan being declared troubled; and for a healthy loan, the three fiscal 
years prior to the firm’s last credit review by the bank) cross-classified by exclusive and nonexclusive 
client relationships.  It is evident that the bank does not use its information about troubled borrowers to 
substantially reduce its exposure to loss; rather, if anything, troubled loans rise in average size.  Since the 
bank has very good information on exclusive borrowers, one might have thought that the bank would 
restrain lending to exclusive borrowers as they get into trouble.  But we find that such loans continue to 
rise in size, on average, despite the deterioration of the borrowers. 
The next four rows show the average annual business sales for all firms and for the healthy and 
troubled loan subsamples, again cross-classified by exclusive and nonexclusive relationships.  Note that 
troubled borrowers do not generally have obviously declining average sales compared to healthy ones. 
Many of these troubled borrowers get into trouble by expanding too aggressively. As might be expected, 
firms that are larger, as measured by sales, tend to deal with more than one bank and so do not have an 
exclusive relationship with the bank under study.   
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the evolution of the borrowers’ credit ratings over time.  At 
the dates when the loans were matched (i.e., at  t−3), there are 19 loans rated superior or standard in the 
group of loans that do not become classified as troubled loans and 31 such loans with substandard credit 
ratings.  At the final rating period (t−1), there are 23 loans rated superior or standard. By contrast, 
although 18 of the troubled loans are rated superior or standard in the initial period, only one is so rated   14
two reviews later.  The divergent movements of the two sets of loans are due to the selection process; all 
the loans that worsen to troubled are selected into the “troubled” group.  
These credit ratings are effective on the date the credit department signs off on the credit review.  
This sign-off date is typically later than the planned credit review date, as the loan officer doing the 
review may ask the borrower for additional information.  In addition, the interval between planned credit 
reviews is not always one year but may be shorter or longer. 
3.2 Monthly data 
The monthly data contain information on the value that the bank assigns to the firm’s accounts 
receivable and inventories, as well as the end-of-month balance in the firm’s bank account. The bank’s 
valuation of accounts receivable and inventories is an important ingredient in determining how much the 
bank is willing to lend to a commercial borrower.  To restrict the use of the operating loan to purely 
operational ends and to ensure that the borrower has adequate collateral for the loan, the bank verifies on 
a monthly basis that the amount borrowed does not exceed the estimated value of the firm’s operating 
assets that serve as collateral.  The underlying data on dated accounts receivable and inventories are 
reported to the bank by the borrower, as provided for in the loan contract.   
The bank’s valuation includes subjective discounts (haircuts) from book value (note, we do not 
have monthly information on these book values).  These haircuts provide a comfort level for the lender; 
they also reflect the liquidity and quality of accounts receivable and inventories.  For example, as 
accounts receivable remain uncollected, their quality (i.e., the probability they will ultimately be 
collected) may deteriorate.  Also, the stage to which the inventory is processed reflects its liquidity – 
works-in-progress inventory is the least valuable, since it is the most difficult to convert to other uses and, 
therefore, to sell to other producers.  In general, our data indicate that this bank values accounts 
receivable at two-thirds to three-quarters of book value, while it values inventories at between one-quarter 
and two-fifths of book value.  The low valuation on inventories also reflects binding ceilings on the 
amount of inventory on which the bank permits the firm to borrow.  On the other hand, credit rating does   15
not seem to have much impact on the size of haircut, although borrowers with a credit rating in the 
“troubled” range may receive a bigger haircut on their accounts receivable than do other borrowers.  This 
presumably reflects the aging of some proportion of the accounts receivable.
9
 
4.   Empirical Results 
 
4.1 The relationship between loan balances and the bank’s valuation of accounts receivable 
 
  Next, we turn to the transparency of the bank balance in providing information on accounts 
receivable.  If we had complete data on loan balances, accounts receivable, and inventories, then, under 
the hypothesis of transparency, almost all the movements in bank balances would be accounted for by 
movements in accounts receivable and inventories.  However, in our data, it appears that there is a limit 
on the amount the bank is willing to lend against inventory.  That is, there is a binding ceiling on the 
bank’s inventory valuation, so that changes in inventory are typically not reflected in our inventory 
valuations data.  For this reason, we focus on the relationship between loan balances and accounts 
receivable. As discussed in section 2, to the extent that there is a high correlation between bank account 
balances and changes in accounts receivable and inventories, changes in the firm’s bank account balance 
can be used to monitor a firm’s operations.  But how high can we expect this correlation to be?  
Obviously, this will depend on the distribution of expenditures, shipments, payments on past shipments, 
and other net outlays.   When inventory is shipped, the borrower writes down its finished goods 
inventory, but the loan balance is unaffected.  Loan balances change only in response to payments, which 
represent only half of the changes in accounts receivable.  This suggests that the correlation between 
accounts receivable and loan balances should be positive and roughly one-half.  In appendix 1, we 
formalize this conjecture.  Note that a similar calculation can be performed for the correlation between the 
change in bank account balance and the change in inventories. 
                                                      
9The mean haircut on accounts receivable was 0.29 for borrowers rated superior or standard and 0.36 for 
borrowers rated as troubled (with one of the three worst credit ratings).  The mean haircut on inventories 
was 0.62 for borrowers rated superior or standard and 0.66 for borrowers rated as troubled.      16
To see whether the bank account balance gives the bank useful information for monitoring the 
firm’s operations, we examined the correlations between changes from the beginning to the end of each 
month in the firm’s checking account balance, and the bank’s valuations of the firm’s accounts receivable 
and inventories.  As discussed in section 2, we hypothesize that the correlation would be stronger for 
firms that have an exclusive relationship with the bank than for firms that do not.  So we repeat the 
correlation analysis for the exclusive and nonexclusive subsamples, and we also divide these subsamples 
into their healthy and troubled loan subgroups, to control for any loan performance effect.  Thus, we 
perform the analysis for seven groups: all loans, exclusive, nonexclusive, exclusive-healthy, 
nonexclusive-healthy, exclusive-troubled, nonexclusive-troubled.  In this analysis we normalize the 
variables by the firm’s annual sales to control for heteroscedasticity.
10
The correlation between changes in bank balances and changes in accounts receivable is 0.45 for 
all loans and is higher for exclusive loans (0.50) than for nonexclusive loans (0.40).  Thus, our data for 
exclusive loans are showing about as high a level of correlation as one should expect. The correlations are 
stronger for firms that deal exclusively with the bank than for firms that have multiple banking 
relationships, even when we control for loan performance.  This suggests there is more information to be 
gleaned about a firm’s operations from the account balances for firms that deal exclusively with the bank 
than for those that have other banking relationships.
11  In addition, the exclusive-troubled borrowers’ 
correlation between movements in the bank account balance and accounts receivable, at 0.44, is lower 
than for exclusive-healthy borrowers, but remains high.  It is significantly greater than the 0.31 
correlation coefficient for nonexclusive borrowers.  (Based on Fisher z-scores, we can reject the 
hypothesis of equal correlation with a p-value of 2.3 percent.) 
                                                      
10To normalize, we use the earliest annual sales figure available for each firm.  For troubled loans, this is 
sales in the fiscal year three years prior to the loans’ being declared troubled, and for healthy loans, this is 
sales in the fiscal year three years prior to the last credit file review. 
11Not only would the bank have less data on nonexclusive firms, but the value of any information it had 
might be lower, since the firm would be less under the bank’s control.   17
 It appears that simply having a continuous record of the borrower’s operating balance in an 
exclusive client relationship provides the lender with a substantial amount of information.  Of course, the 
loan officer has access to even better information, as the loan officer can examine individual checks and 
deposits.
12  
The correlations between changes in inventories and changes in either bank balances or accounts 
receivable are much smaller than the correlations between changes in bank balances and accounts 
receivable.  This is because there is generally much less variation in changes in inventory valuations than 
in the other variables.  Indeed, roughly 20 percent of the monthly observations of the bank’s valuation of 
inventories appear to be at an upper limit.  These are cases where there are more than two observations at 
the same valuation and that valuation is the highest observed for that borrower.  This bank’s monitoring 
operation does not include collecting detailed information on inventory.  This may be contrasted with 
those finance companies that focus on inventory, where lenders regularly make site visits to verify this 
collateral (Udell, 2004). 
This analysis suggests that changes in accounts receivable potentially contain useful information 
about firm operations; however, our data do not permit us to reach a similar conclusion about inventories. 
 The empirical analysis in the next sections attempts to determine whether indeed there is useful 
information and how the bank uses such information. 
4.2 The relationship between signals of firm trouble, credit downgrades, and troubled firms 
 
The monthly data allow the lender to detect two signals of potential trouble at the firm.  The first 
signal is when the bank’s loan balance exceeds the bank’s valuation of collateral, i.e., of accounts 
receivable and inventory.  The second signal is whether the borrower is consistently borrowing an amount 
close to or exceeding the credit line authorized at the beginning of the credit year.  These two signals 
                                                      
12Note that we also find a stronger correlation for healthy loans than for troubled loans, holding 
exclusivity constant.  This may reflect the fact that when loans become troubled, the bank may lower its 
valuations and the loan limits may become binding on the firm.  (It also suggests that the bank’s control is 
not perfect.)  This would disrupt the normal relationship between checking account balances and bank 
valuations of accounts receivable.   18
differ sharply on what kinds of lenders can use them.  The first type of signal is likely to be accurate only 
for lenders with access to transactions account data, since only such a lender can track the high frequency 
movements in collateral valuations and thus can create a reliable signal based on them.  Monthly 
monitoring and valuation of accounts receivable and inventories are likely to be very difficult for a lender 
who does not have access to the transactions account data we have documented as providing useful 
information.  On the other hand, a signal based just on information on the firm’s account balance would 
be available to any lender.  Presumably any lender will know the extent to which the borrower is using or 
even exceeding the authorized credit line.  We compare the informativeness of these two types of signals 
and are specifically interested in what additional information is provided by our bank’s valuations of 
collateral. 
Our measures of these two types of signals are exceed and utilization.  Exceed is the amount the 
firm has borrowed less the firm’s collateral (as measured by the bank’s valuation of the firm’s accounts 
receivable and inventories and other guarantees posted by the firm), as a percent of the firm’s authorized 
credit line.  Utilization is the firm’s borrowing as a percent of its authorized credit line.  Exceed is a signal 
of trouble available to only a transactions-based lender, while utilization is available to any lender.  
Troubled firms are likely to have higher, and possibly positive, values of exceed and higher values of 
utilization.  These higher valuations are usually due to excessive borrowing but also may on occasion be 
due to declines in the bank’s valuations of accounts receivable and inventory and in the borrower’s credit 
line. 
Both exceed and utilization are computed using the monthly data on the firm, and thus, they are 
likely to be better signs of trouble for exclusive borrowers than for nonexclusive borrowers, since the 
bank has more accurate monthly data on exclusive borrowers.  As expected, we found higher mean values 
of exceed and utilization for exclusive-troubled firms than for exclusive-healthy firms.  In our tests, we 
focus on exclusive borrowers, as our theory and data suggest that banks have the best information on   19
these borrowers.  However, broadly similar results are obtained for nonexclusive borrowers (all but one of 
the nonexclusive borrowers has an exclusive operating loan with our bank.) 
 When  exceed turns positive, the bank is at risk, in that the borrower’s ability to relatively quickly 
pay off the loan has become stretched.  This is a warning signal to the loan officer and to the bank.  How 
useful is this signal?  We define a variable, violations, which equals the number of months for which 
exceed is positive over the three years prior to our reference date (either the date when a loan was 
declared troubled or the date of a healthy loan’s last credit review).  We also define violations_i, i=1,2,3, 
which is the number of months exceed is positive in the i
 th year before the reference date.  Similarly, we 
define nonviolations and nonviolations_i, i=1,2,3, which are the number of months for which exceed is 
negative.  Note that violations and nonviolations will not necessarily sum to 36.  This can happen either 
because data are missing or because the firm is just borrowing an amount equal to the bank’s valuation of 
its collateral.  Months for which our data are incomplete so that violations and nonviolations cannot be 
computed, or months in which the firm’s borrowing equals the bank’s valuation of its collateral, do not 
count as positive or negative exceed and, therefore, do not increase either violations or nonviolations. 
Thus, the sum of violations and nonviolations would not equal 36.  Therefore, we are able to include both 
violations and nonviolations in the regressions.  This provides us meaningful information because lack of 
data has a different meaning from either violations or nonviolations, as suggested by the negative 
coefficients on nonviolations. 
We are interested in two nested types of outcomes: downgrades of a loan’s credit rating and, 
among these, downgrades to “troubled.”  The declaration that a borrower is troubled requires an 
immediate write-down of the loan and is also tantamount to failure of the borrower; in almost all cases, 
the ultimate outcome is bankruptcy or liquidation (see the top panel of Table 1).  Failure of the borrower 
is a more clearly objective event than a credit downgrade, which is explicitly subjective, and need not 
have immediate consequences. Thus we expect that signals of trouble will have quick and full impacts on 
credit downgrades – and that is what we find.   20
4.3 Usefulness of the bank balance data for monitoring borrowers 
We ran OLS regressions and logit regressions of whether a loan was eventually declared troubled 
on violations, nonviolations, and utilization.  The OLS results for exclusive clients are shown in 
Table 3.
13  First note that the coefficients have the expected signs.  Moreover, asymptotic F-tests indicate 
that the null hypothesis that the  violations and nonviolations can be excluded is rejected at a high level of 
significance.  The results are little changed if we exclude borrowers for which the bank lacks information 
about violations.   
The coefficients are also economically significant. Violations has a standard deviation of 8.1, 
nonviolations has a standard deviation of 10.5; thus, a one-standard-deviation increase in either increases 
the probability of being declared troubled by roughly 10 percent.  As we shall see, these results understate 
the value of these data, as it is mainly recent violations that determine credit rating changes and 
declarations of “troubled.” 
4.4 Speed with which the lender acts on signals from the bank balance 
How quickly is this information used?  Two pieces of evidence suggest that the information is 
used relatively soon after it is available.  Most of the information that determines whether a loan is 
declared troubled is in violations in the most recent fiscal year before a declaration of trouble, as shown in 
Table 4.  Here we use our disaggregated measures of violations, violations_1, violations_2, and 
violations_3, which give separate counts of the number of violations according to how far in advance they 
took place before the loan was declared troubled (or before the final fiscal year for healthy borrowers).  
The results in Table 4 are based on the sample of exclusive loans, omitting those for which there was no 
information on violations during the third year prior to declaration.  The first column of Table 4 shows 
the regression results for whether or not loans were declared “troubled.” The coefficients on the three 
violations variables are jointly strongly significantly different from zero. The bulk of the information is 
                                                      
13The logit results are qualitatively the same and are available upon request from the authors.   21
derived from the last year: the coefficients on violations in the two earlier years are jointly statistically 
insignificant.   
Violations in the last year (violations_1) are also important economically.  The standard deviation 
of this variable is 3.55, so a one-standard-deviation increase in violations in the last year raises the 
probability of being declared troubled by 32 percentage points.   
A one-standard-deviation increase in credit utilization raises the probability of being declared 
troubled by 12 percentage points, an important amount, but less than for violations in the last year.  It is 
interesting that temporally disaggregating credit utilization does not improve the fit.  Indeed, substituting 
year-by-year data on credit utilization results in a jointly insignificant set of parameters (this result is not 
shown in the table but is available from the authors upon request). 
Now consider downgrades of loans at the second review date, i.e., at least a year prior to when the 
loan was declared troubled.
14  Here we would expect that the most important information would be 
violations that occurred in the second year prior to the declaration that the loan is troubled, i.e., in the year 
prior to this particular downgrade.  The second column in Table 4 shows that is indeed the case. Again, 
the coefficients on the three violations variables are jointly strongly significantly different from zero.  
Almost all the information provided by violations in explaining downgrades in the second year is 
contained in violations that occurred in the year prior to the downgrade (violations_2): violations in the 
two other years are statistically insignificant.  In addition, the information is quantitatively important: a 
one-standard-deviation change in violations in the second year raises the probability of a decline in credit 
rating by 21 percentage points.  Again, temporally disaggregating credit utilization results in insignificant 
parameter estimates. 
A third piece of evidence concerns profit movements.  Somewhat to our surprise, declarations of 
troubled are not always preceded by negative profits; indeed, 16 of the 50 loans declared troubled had 
positive profits in the last annual report before being declared troubled.  It appears that accounting profits   22
are a noisy measure of true profitability; in particular, assets that expanding firms have booked can lose 
value suddenly.  Nevertheless, it is of interest to see whether violations are useful in signaling negative 
accounting profits.  The results are in the third column in Table 4.  Violations in all three years are related 
to negative profits in the last year before being declared troubled.  Violations taken together are 
statistically significant, but the economic importance of violations in the last year is somewhat diminished 
compared to their economic importance in predicting whether the loan will be declared troubled or 
downgraded. 
 
Taken together these results show that information on violations are highly significant and 
quantitatively important in periods immediately preceding loans being declared troubled when loans are 
made to borrowers whose only bank relationship is with the monitoring bank.  The bank also uses such 
information quickly in determining credit downgrades.  Violations are also informative about borrower 
profitability. 
4.5 Impact of violations on monitoring 
Results shown in our final two tables indicate that the lender intensifies its monitoring of risky 
loans by spending more time in loan review and by reducing the time between loan reviews.  Evidence 
was gleaned by examining the date on which a credit review was completed relative to the date the review 
was planned to be completed and changes in the frequency of planned reviews.  
We expect that violations trigger more intensive monitoring of loans.  For loans with violations, 
the completion of the credit review should be later than the planned completion date relative to loans 
without violations, since the reviewer is likely to review loans with violations more closely.  A credit 
review is typically prolonged by the bank’s requests for additional information, such as more complete 
financial statements and more detail about projected future disbursements from the bank account. The 
                                                                                                                                                                           
14Since the results for downgrades at the final review date are virtually identical to the results for 
declarations of “trouble,” we omit them here for brevity; they are available upon request from the authors.   23
bank may negotiate changes in the terms of the loan (for example, asking for personal guarantees, such as 
the pledge of property), and such negotiations may take time.  Thus a lengthy delay between the expected 
loan review date and the sign-off by the loan officer is a strong sign that monitoring has been intensified.  
Similarly, we expect that violations are likely to trigger more frequent examination of the loans. Clearly, 
more frequent loan reviews are signs of more intensive monitoring, as they require more data collection 
and analysis per unit of time.   
Table 5 sorts exclusive loans on the number of violations they eventually have – in particular, we 
divide the loans into two groups: those with violations less than or equal to the median level of violations 
over the sample of loans and those with violations greater than the median level.  (The median level is 2.5 
violations for all loans, exclusive and nonexclusive.)  This is information that the bank can discern from a 
firm’s checking account.  First, we find that loans with greater numbers of violations do have their credit 
reviews delayed relative to loans that have fewer violations: for example, in the third year prior to our 
reference date, 86 percent of loans with fewer violations have a delayed review while in the first year 
prior, only 67 percent do; the length of delay declines from 108 days, on average, to 32 days.  For loans 
with a greater number of violations, there is little decline in the number of delayed reviews and a much 
smaller decline in the average length of delay, compared to loans with fewer violations.  Note that there is 
a significant difference in days delayed in the year prior to the reference date between loans with more 
violations and loans with fewer violations. 
The bottom panel shows that the number of days between planned reviews increases for loans 
with fewer violations but declines for loans with a greater number of violations, and there is a statistically 
significant difference in the average number of days between planned reviews in the second year prior to 
the reference date for the two groups of loans.
15,    16   
                                                      
15The right side of the bottom panel of Table 5 indicates there is little change over the three years in the 
number of high-violation loans whose planned reviews are significantly more than a year apart and there 
is little change in those whose planned reviews are less than a year apart.  However, over the three years, 
the number of low-violation loans whose reviews are significantly more than a year apart increases.  This   24
4.6 Monitoring troubled loans 
We see similar patterns, and somewhat stronger ones, when we compare healthy and troubled 
loans.  The evidence is that as loans deteriorate, monitoring becomes more intensive and costly.  At the 
beginning of the period covered by our data (t−3), healthy loans were approximately as creditworthy as 
the troubled loans.  Over time, the healthy loans, on average, improve in quality, while the troubled loans, 
by definition, deteriorate. Table 6 shows that among healthy loans, delays in loan reviews decrease 
compared to planned dates.  For example, in the third year prior to our reference date, 88 percent of 
healthy loans have a delayed review, while, in the first year prior, only 69 percent do.  Moreover, the 
length of delay is cut by three-fourths – from about 131 days to 40 days, on average.  In contrast, for 
loans that remain troubled, there is little lessening in the number of delayed reviews or average length of 
delay, and the difference in the average number of days delayed in the year prior between the healthy and 
troubled loans is statistically significant. 
The lower part of Table 6 shows that over time, as the troubled loans worsen, the time planned 
between credit reviews shortens on average, while for loans that improve in health, the time between 
reviews increases.  For example, for troubled loans, on average, the time between planned reviews 
decreases by about 33 days over the three years, whereas for healthy loans, on average, planned reviews 
become less frequent by about 32 days.  
Overall, the results in Tables 5 and 6 indicate that borrowers whose borrowing needs exceed the 
bank’s valuations of accounts receivable and inventories and loans that become troubled have their credit 
ratings downgraded at the next credit review.  Together with downgrading of credit, scrutiny appears to 
become stronger, with the credit review itself dragging on and the time between reviews sometimes 
becoming shorter.   
                                                                                                                                                                           
increase is about the same as the increase in the number of low-violation loans whose reviews are 
significantly less than a year apart. 
16Similar results are obtained if instead of dividing the loans into two groups, we divide them into three 
groups: violations = 0; 0 < violations ≤ 10; and violations > 10.   25
5.  Conclusion 
This paper has described the efforts of one Canadian bank to use information in transactions 
accounts to scrutinize the activities of small-business borrowers.  It is clear from the evidence that the 
bank does use instances where borrowings exceed the bank’s own valuation of a firm’s accounts 
receivable and inventories as a signal of deterioration in credit.  Moreover, movements in checking 
account balances are closely related to movements in the bank’s valuation of accounts receivable and 
inventories, suggesting strongly that the checking account provides a relatively transparent window on 
these aspects of a firm’s activity.  Although our results pertain to only one bank, we believe that these 
results taken together provide detailed micro-level evidence that transactions account data are useful for 
monitoring borrowers.  While any asset-based lender with access to transactions account data, such as 
finance companies, could use the information for monitoring the borrowers’ operating loans, commercial 
banks are likely to be the most efficient at doing so, since they offer the transactions accounts.   26
Table 1.  Loan Summary Statistics 
 
Final outcome of the 50 firms whose loans became troubled: 









Bankruptcy of the firm  10  (20%)       6 (12%)     4 (8%) 
Private liquidation of the firm  26  (52%)     20 (40%)     6 (12%) 
Loan remained troubled    9  (18%)       3 (6%)     6 (12%) 
Loan repaid    4 (8%)       3  (6%)     1 (2%) 
Loan upgraded to healthy    1 (2%)       0 (0%)     1 (2%)   27
 
Table 1, con’t.  Loan Summary Statistics 
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Average annual business sales 
 
 






















































































































*Averaged over months and firms, with standard deviation of loan size or business sales in parentheses.  For healthy loans, the reference date is the last time the firm’s credit file 
was reviewed by the bank. For troubled loans, the reference date is the date when the loan was declared troubled.
   28
Table 1, con’t. Loan Summary Statistics 
 
Credit Ratings for Loans  
        -––––––––––- Reservations ––––––––––––- -––––––––––- Troubled ––––––––––––- 
  Superior = 1  Standard = 2 Mild = 3  Average = 4  Strong = 5    Standard = 6  Severe = 7  Very Severe = 8 
Healthy Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                  4 15 23 0 8
No. of Loans at t−2                  3 17 23 0 7
No. of Loans at t−1                  4 19 18 0 9
                 
Exclusive, Healthy Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                  2 9 11 0 4
No. of Loans at t−2                  2 10 12 0 2
No. of Loans at t−1                  3 12 8 0 3
                 
Nonexclusive, Healthy Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                  2 6 12 0 4
No. of Loans at t−2                  1 7 11 0 5
No. of Loans at t−1                  1 7 10 0 6
                 
Troubled Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                  3 15 28 0 4 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−2                1 2  14 1 31 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−1                   0 1 2 1 6 29 5 6
                 
Exclusive, Troubled Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                  1 8 29 0 4 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−2                   1 1 9 1 20 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−1                   0 1 2 1 3 19 4 3
                 
Nonexclusive, Troubled Loans                
No. of Loans at t−3                   2 7 8 0 0 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−2                   0 1 5 0 11 0 0 0
No. of Loans at t−1                   0 0 0 0 3 10 1 3  29




% of sample 
(100 loans) 
 
% of exclusive loans 
(59 loans) 
 
% of nonexclusive loans 
(41 loans) 
% of healthy loans 
(50 loans) 
% of troubled loans 
(50 loans) 
 
Manufacturing  42.0%       42.4%  41.5%  42.0%       42.0%      
 
Wholesale Trade  20.0% 27.1%  9.8%  20.0%  20.0% 
 
Services  20.0% 15.3%  26.8%  20.0%  20.0% 
 
Retail Trade  10.0% 8.5%  12.2%  10.0%  10.0% 
 





2.0% 1.7%  2.4%  2.0%  2.0% 
 
†Exclusive loans are loans made to firms that have an exclusive banking relationship with the bank. Nonexclusive loans are 
loans made to firms that have relationships with other banks as well.  Note, the distributions of healthy and troubled loans by 
industry are identical because pairs were matched on industry category. Second and third columns do not sum to 100% due to 
rounding.  30





Dependent variable: Dummy variable equal to 1 



















































Asymptotic F-test for 



















†Includes all exclusive loans with information on violations or nonviolations.   
 Ordinary least squares regressions. White robust standard errors in parentheses.  p-values in italics. 
*Significant at 5% level.  ** Significant at 10% level. 
 
 
Violations is the number of months in the three years prior to the reference date in which the amount the firm has borrowed is 
greater than the firm’s collateral (as measured by the bank’s valuation of the firm’s accounts receivable and inventories and other 
guarantees posted by the firm); the reference date is the date when a loan was declared troubled for troubled loans, and the date 
of a healthy loan’s last credit review for healthy loans.  Similarly, nonviolations is the number of months in the three years prior 
to our reference date in which borrowing is less than collateral.  Months in which our data are incomplete so that violations and 
nonviolations cannot be computed do not increase either violations or nonviolations.  Thus, if data are missing, or if the firm is 
just borrowing an amount equal to the bank’s valuation of its collateral, the sum of violations and nonviolations will differ from 
36, and therefore, both variables can be included in the regression.  Credit utilization is the firm’s borrowing as a percent of its 
authorized credit line. 
 
The mean and standard deviations (in paretheses) of the variables used in the regressions in the sample with 56 observations are 
as follows: violations: 7.89 (8.15); nonviolations: 21.43 (10.17); credit utilization: 0.587 (0.428); declaration of troubled: 0.536 
(0.503).  31
Table 4.  Regression Results of Exclusive Troubled Loans, Credit Downgrades in the 2
nd Year 
Before Classification, and Negative Profits in the Year Before Classification on Signs of 
Trouble in Each of Three Prior Years† 
 
  Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 
for loans declared troubled 
and equal to 0 otherwise 
Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
loans whose credit rating was 
lowered in the next to last credit 
review before being declared 
troubled, and equal to 0 
otherwise 
Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 
for loans whose profits 
were negative at the time 
of last credit review before 
being declared troubled, 
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Asymptotic F-test for 
excluding the variables  
violations 1,2, and 3 years 
















Asymptotic F-test for 
excluding violations: 
























† Exclusive loans with information on violations or nonviolations in the 3rd year.  Ordinary least squares regressions.  White 
robust standard errors in parentheses.  p-values in italics. 
*Significant at 5% level.  ** Significant at 10% level. 
 
Violations_i is the number of months in year i prior to the reference date in which the amount the firm has borrowed is greater 
than the firm’s collateral (as measured by the bank’s valuation of the firm’s accounts receivable and inventories and other 
guarantees posted by the firm), i = 1,2,3; the reference date is the date when a loan was declared troubled for troubled loans, and 
the date of a healthy loan’s last credit review for healthy loans.  Similarly, nonviolations_i is the number of months in year i 
prior to our reference date in which borrowing is less than collateral.  Credit utilization is the firm’s borrowing as a percent of its 
authorized credit line. 
 
The mean and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the variables used in the regressions in the sample with 44 observations are 
as follows: violations_1: 3.36 (3.55); violations_2: 2.97 (3.54); violations_3: 2.48 (3.27); credit utilization: 0.590 (0.469); 
declaration of troubled: 0.500 (0.506); downgrade two years prior: 0.318 (0.471); negative profit one year prior: 0.273 (0.451).  32
Table 5.  Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring in Response to Violations Based on the Monthly 
Bank Account Information for Exclusive Loans† 
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†For all exclusive loans categorized by whether the number of violations is greater or less than the median number of violations 
in the sample of all loans.   
A delayed review is one in which the credit review is completed after the planned credit review date.  The number of days 
delayed is the calendar number of days from the planned credit review date to the credit review completion date.  Similarly, the 
number of days between planned reviews is the calendar number of days from one planned credit review to the next. 
 
*Values for loans with the number of violations less than or equal to the median are significantly different from the values for 
loans with the number of violations greater than the median at the 5% level. 
**Values for loans with the number of violations less than or equal to the median are significantly different from the values for 
loans with the number of violations greater than the median at the 10% level.  33
Table 6.  Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring as Loans Deteriorate for Exclusive Loans† 
 
 





% of Delayed Reviews 
 
Average Number of Days Delayed 
 












































































Average Number of Days  
Between Planned Reviews 
 
Average Change in 
Number of Days Between 
Planned Reviews 
 
Percentage of Loans Whose 
Days Between 




















3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior 
 
2nd year prior to 
year prior 
 
Between 3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior and 2nd year 
prior to year prior 
 
3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior 
 










Number of days between 
planned reviews increases, 

















Number of days between 
planned reviews decreases, 










†For all loans categorized by healthy vs. troubled.   
 
A delayed review is one in which the credit review is completed after the planned credit review date.  The number of days 
delayed is the calendar number of days from the planned credit review date to the credit review completion date.  Similarly, the 
number of days between planned reviews is the calendar number of days from one planned credit review to the next. 
 
*Values for healthy and troubled loans are significantly different from each other at the 5% level. 
**Values for healthy and troubled loans are significantly different from each other at the 10% level.  34
Appendix 1.   
 Representative Loan Contract 
A representative loan contract for the bank we study included the following language: 
“Total outstandings are not to exceed 75% of good accounts receivable, 
excluding accounts over 90 days and inter-company accounts plus 50% of inventory, up 
to a maximum of $5 million dollars, including raw material, work in process and finished 
products, less priority claims.” 
“The Borrower will deliver to the Bank such financial information as the Bank may 
reasonably request including but not limited to the following: 
a)  audited annual financial statements of the Borrower, within 90 days after the 
fiscal year end; 
 
b)  in-house monthly financial statements of the Borrower within 20 days after 
the end of the month; 
 
c)  monthly aged listing of accounts receivable and inventory reports within 20 
days after the end of month.” 
 
A simple accounting model 
A simple accounting model shows the relationship between changes in accounts receivable, 
inventories, and bank account balance.  In month t, the borrowing firm makes expenditures xt to make 
products that increase the firm’s inventories.  It also makes shipments, yt, which reduce inventories and 
increase accounts receivable.  Then if the firm sells its products at a constant markup of m, shipments will 
increase accounts receivable by yt(1+m).  At time t, the firm will also receive some payments zt on past 
shipments, which decrease accounts receivable.  Net operating outlays are then xt − zt.  Let all other net 
outlays be wt; these will include liquidity declines caused by unanticipated operating losses or 
expenditures. 
Let the firm’s bank balance (i.e., what it owes the bank lender, on net) be Bt, and let the monthly 
interest rate on the loan (assumed constant over time) be r.  Then Bt = Bt-1(1+r) + xt − zt + wt.  Similarly, 
let Rt be accounts receivable and St be inventories.  Then Rt = Rt-1 + yt(1+m) − zt and St = St-1 + xt − yt.   35
The changes in bank balances, accounts receivable, and inventories are: 
∆Bt = Bt-1r + xt − zt + wt, (A.1) 
∆Rt = yt(1+m) − zt, (A.2) 
∆St = xt − yt. (A.3) 
The sum of changes in accounts receivable and inventories will approximately equal changes in 
bank balance, depending on the relative size of interest accruals (which depend on r), markup (m), and net 
other outlays (wt).  The size of interest accruals are, of course, known to the lender, as is the expected 
markup.  Thus, if the lender knows the changes in inventories and accounts receivable, then knowledge of 
the bank balance is equivalent to knowledge of other net outlays.  
The reverse is true too.  If movements in wt are infrequent, the bank balance can generally be used 
to monitor changes in inventory and accounts receivable. 
The correlation between changes in the loan balance and the bank’s valuation of accounts 
receivable 
  To the extent that there is a high correlation between bank account balances and changes in 
accounts receivable and inventories, changes in the firm’s bank account balance can be used to monitor a 
firm’s operations.  
We can derive approximate values of the correlations under certain simplifying assumptions.  For 
example, suppose the bank values the collateral represented by the accounts receivable at vR.  (It applies a 
haircut, since there is some chance the accounts receivable will not be collected.)  Then, using equation 
(2) in the text, the change in the bank’s valuation of accounts receivable is ∆vRt = vRt − vRt-1 = v[yt(1+m) 
− zt].  If m is small, then 
∆vRt ≈ v(yt − zt). (A.4) 
The correlation between the change in the firm’s bank account balance and the change in the 
bank’s valuation of the firm’s accounts receivable is 
corr(∆Bt, ∆vRt) =  covariance(∆Bt,∆vRt) / [variance(∆Bt)
1/2 variance(∆vRt)
 1/2]. 
Using equations (A.1) and (A.4), and assuming r is small, then   36
corr(∆Bt, ∆vRt) 
≈ cov(xt − zt + wt, v(yt − zt)) / [var(xt − zt + wt)
 1/2 var(v(yt − zt))
 1/2] 
= {[v cov(xt,yt) − v cov(xt,zt) − v cov(zt,yt) + v var(zt) + v cov(wt,yt) − v cov(wt,zt)]}/ 
   {[var(xt) + var(zt) + var(wt) − 2cov(xt,zt) − 2cov(zt,wt) + 2cov(xt,wt)]
 1/2  × 
   [v
2 var(yt) + v




As an approximation, assume xt, yt, zt, wt are independent.  Then, 
corr(∆Bt, ∆vRt) = [var(zt)] / [var(xt) + var(zt) + var(wt)]
 1/2  [var(yt) + var(zt)]
 1/2. 
If other payments are not variable, i.e., var(wt) = 0 and the variance in goods purchased, goods sold, and 
payments received is similar, i.e., var(xt) = var(yt) = var(zt), then 
corr(∆Bt, ∆vRt) ≈ [var(zt)] / [2var(zt)]
 1/2  [2var(zt)]
 1/2  = 1/2. 
A similar calculation can be performed for the correlation between the change in bank account balance 
and the change in inventories.  Table A1.1 shows the correlations by loan category. 
Obviously, this is a rough approximation, based on a number of simplifying assumptions.  But it 
gives an idea of the magnitude of the correlation we would need to find to anticipate that the bank account 
balance might be a useful indicator of firm operations.   37
Table A1.1.  Correlations and Variances of Monthly Changes in Bank Account Balances, Bank’s 
Valuation of Accounts Receivable and Inventories 
 
This table reports the correlations and variances by category of loan of monthly changes in the borrowers’ 
bank account balances and the bank’s valuation of the borrowers’ accounts receivable and inventories.  A 
positive bank account balance corresponds to a firm’s borrowings exceeding its deposits; a negative bank 
account balance corresponds to a firm’s deposits exceeding its borrowings.  Thus, positive bank account 
balances indicate the firm is borrowing, on net.  The correlations are between monthly changes, scaled by 
dividing by annual sales.  For troubled loans, this is sales in the fiscal year three years prior to the loans’ 
being declared troubled, and for healthy loans, this is sales in the fiscal year three years prior to the last 





































































































































0.00233 0.00209  0.00315  0.00207 0.00367 0.00211 0.00272 
Accounts 
Receivable 
0.00198 0.00204  0.00178  0.00226 0.00177 0.00182 0.00180 
Inventories  0.00053 0.00040  0.00098  0.00023 0.00112 0.00057 0.00085   38
Appendix 2.  Results using all loans (exclusive and nonexclusive loans) 
 
The following tables report comparable results to tables 3 to 6 in the paper using all the loans instead of 
just exclusive loans. 
Table A2.1.  Regression Results of Troubled Loans on Signs of Trouble in All Three Years Prior 




Dependent variable: Dummy 
variable equal to 1 for loans 
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†Ordinary least squares regressions.  White robust standard errors in parentheses.  p-values in italics. 
*Significant at 5% level.  ** Significant at 10% level. 
 
Violations is the number of months in the three years prior to the reference date in which the amount the firm has borrowed is 
greater than the firm’s collateral (as measured by the bank’s valuation of the firm’s accounts receivable and inventories and other 
guarantees posted by the firm); the reference date is the date when a loan was declared troubled for troubled loans, and the date 
of a healthy loan’s last credit review for healthy loans.  Similarly, nonviolations is the number of months in the three years prior 
to our reference date in which borrowing is less than collateral.  Months in which our data are incomplete so that violations and 
nonviolations cannot be computed do not increase either violations or nonviolations.  Thus, if data are missing, or if the firm is 
just borrowing an amount equal to the bank’s valuation of its collateral, the sum of violations and nonviolations will differ from 
36, and therefore, both variables can be included in the regression.  Credit utilization is the firm’s borrowing as a percent of its 
authorized credit line.   39
Table A2.2.  Regression Results of Troubled Loans, Credit Downgrades in the 2
nd Year Before 
Classification, and Negative Profits in the Year Before Classification on Signs of 
Trouble in Each of Three Prior Years (comparable to Table 4 results in the paper but 
using all loans rather than just exclusive loans)† 
   
  Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 
for loans declared troubled 
and equal to 0 otherwise 
Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 for 
loans whose credit rating was 
lowered in the next to last credit 
review before being declared 
troubled, and equal to 0 
otherwise 
Dependent variable:  
Dummy variable equal to 1 
for loans whose profits 
were negative at the time 
of last credit review before 
being declared troubled, 
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Asymptotic F-test for 
excluding the variables  
violations 1,2, and 3 years 
















Asymptotic F-test for 
excluding violations: 
2 & 3 years prior: 
F(2,55)=.62 
p=..5410 
1 & 3 years prior: 
F(2,55)=2.73 
p=.0741 












† All loans with information on violations or nonviolations in the 3rd year.  Ordinary least squares regressions.  White robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  p-values in italics. 
*Significant at 5% level.  ** Significant at 10% level. 
 
Violations and credit utilization are defined as in Table 4.    40
Table A2.3.  Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring in Response to Violations Based on the 
Monthly Bank Account Information for All Loans (comparable to results in Table 5 but using all 
loans instead of just exclusive loans)† 
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Loans with ≤ 
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planned reviews decreases, 










Loans with > 







Number of days between 
planned reviews decreases, 










†For all loans categorized by whether the number of violations is greater or less than the median number of violations in the 
sample of all loans.   
A delayed review in one in which the credit review is completed after the planned credit review date.  The number of days 
delayed is the calendar number of days from the planned credit review date to the credit review completion date.  Similarly, the 
number of days between planned reviews is the calendar number of days from one planned credit review to the next. 
 
*Values for loans with the number of violations less than or equal to the median are significantly different from the values for 
loans with the number of violations greater than the median at the 5% level.  41
Table A2.4.  Evidence of More Intensive Monitoring as Loans Deteriorate† 
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Days Between 




















3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior 
 
2nd year prior to 
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Between 3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior and 2nd year 
prior to year prior 
 
3rd year prior to 
2nd year prior 
 










Number of days between 
planned reviews increases, 

















Number of days between 
planned reviews decreases, 










†For all loans categorized by healthy vs. troubled.   
A delayed review in one in which the credit review is completed after the planned credit review date.  The number of days 
delayed is the calendar number of days from the planned credit review date to the credit review completion date.  Similarly, the 
number of days between planned reviews is the calendar number of days from one planned credit review to the next. 
 
*Values for healthy and troubled loans are significantly different from each other at the 5% level.   42
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